Summary

This article looks forwards to likely events on devolution, in the context of England in particular. In summary I think it likely that:

• nothing of significance will happen this year nor (probably) in 2011
• if there were to be a Conservative government with a working majority, either following the forthcoming election or (if there were to be a hung Parliament) on any subsequent election later this year or at the beginning of next year, by the end of that Parliament some form of restricted voting at Westminster will be introduced
• the Barnett formula will remain for the moment
• regional devolution though desirable is a lost cause
• there will be no English Parliament in the short to medium term, although one may well occur by default in coming decades

Constraints

It is difficult to chart the constitutional future over the short term – say, the next five years – because much depends on the outcome of the forthcoming election, or if that were not to result in a working majority for the government which then ends up in office, in the election thereafter which (in the event of a hung Parliament) would be likely to take place later this year or the beginning of next year.

So far as concerns the future, what I think will happen is different from what I would like to happen. In this article I will mention both. In doing so, I will first deal with the “big ticket” issue of the political representation of England (if any) within the UK, and secondly in a very limited way with the question of UK financial arrangements, although as I mention further below, the two cannot be wholly disengaged.

English votes on English laws

The Labour party went into its 1997 devolution proposals with no working plans for an English dimension for the UK constitution, and there will remain none whilst Gordon Brown remains leader of that party. For any incoming government, including a David Cameron government, the first priority will be the economy and the budget deficit. Nothing will happen in relation to the English Question/the West Lothian Question in the first session of a new Parliament, which will be a long session lasting until prorogation in November 2011 prior to a second Queen’s Speech.

However, I expect a Tory government to introduce some form of restricted voting within the term of any Parliament with a Tory majority, probably based on the proposals of Ken Clarke’s Democracy Taskforce. This will partly be through self-interest (it gives the Tories more opportunities to stake their claims in the event of a Labour government being elected in the future with only a small majority); partly because there is an inadequacy in the current UK constitutional arrangements which it seems difficult to consider can remain unaddressed for ever and the Conservatives do not want to end up with an English Parliament; partly because it gives David Cameron’s own back-benchers something that a number of them feel strongly about; and partly because he has previously publicly come out in favour of it and he cannot too often be seen not to be implementing what he has said he would implement.

In addition, this dovetails nicely with implementation of proposals similar to those of the Calman Commission recommendations for additional financial devolution for Scotland, and with any successful outcome of the referendum on whether the Welsh Assembly should obtain law making powers under Part 4 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 similar to (although slightly reduced from) those of the Scottish Parliament.

The required approval of two-thirds of the whole number of members of the Assembly has recently been given to the holding of such a referendum, although there remains some doubt about the outcome of the referendum, which would take place after the general election. However, it seems difficult to believe that the referendum would escape the gaze of those who already think the West Lothian Question is bad enough without adding a West Clwyd Question to it. It seems likely that Calman Commission implementation, Welsh law-making powers and the position of England will be treated together as a package by the Tories.

Furthermore, my own view is that the Tory calculation that introducing such arrangements for England would do less damage than doing nothing is the correct calculation. Not all of course agree with this. Professor Victor Bogdanor is probably the best known and most widely respected champion of the status quo, and has published a number of articles on the subject. The arguments that he and others of his persuasion have presented on this are twofold:

1. A scheme of English votes on English laws at Westminster is unworkable if a UK government were to be reliant on its Scottish, Northern Irish and (after the Welsh Assembly acquires law making powers under Part 4 of the Government of Wales Act 2006) Welsh members for its majority. One of the pillars of the unwritten constitution concerning the Westminster parliament is the principle that the government must be able to get its business through and to whip the members of its own party wherever elected in the UK to any extent that it wishes in order to do so. A scheme of English votes on English laws would in practice (so the argument goes) collapse into a separate English Parliament and government within Westminster by another name, whenever the UK government did not have a majority in England.
2. Under the Barnett formula, decisions affecting expenditure in England on matters devolved elsewhere will feed through into amounts paid to the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Consolidated Funds with respect to those devolved matters. This is sometimes referred to as the “Barnett consequential”. There is therefore no such thing (on this argument) as an “England-only” matter for which either an English parliament, English members at Westminster or regional parliaments for England could or should in practice take jurisdiction. Barnett and devolution for England don’t mix.

These conventional attacks on proposals to limit voting rights at Westminster are in part at least attacks on a straw man. Even if the Barnett consequential argument were decisive in precluding devolution in England (which for the reasons mentioned below I do not believe it is), no proposals emanating from the Tories involving an English Grand Committee, whether from Ken Clarke's Democracy Taskforce or from Malcolm Rifkind, would prevent members for the whole of the UK having a decisive say on whether laws affecting only England should pass both at second and third readings. Thus no Act could pass without the approval of all members, but an English Grand Committee could, depending on how it were implemented, prevent a repetition of, for example, the student top-up fees affair being forced on people in England. They could certainly not collapse into an English Parliament by another name.

The principle that the government must be able to get its business through needs to be considered more seriously. The calculation of opponents of restricted voting at Westminster is first that were there to be a government dependent on its Scottish MPs for its majority, less instability would arise from those MPs being able to decide matters in England which are devolved in Scotland than the reverse; and secondly that it is unacceptable if a government were to be unable to get its legislative program through for England on devolved matters without the agreement of other parties in such circumstances.

I think both ideas are challengeable. Whilst the present system may be able to accommodate the odd student top-up fees affair occurring, I do not believe it could survive it happening with regularity. Apart from it simply being undemocratic, it would be likely to generate considerable ill feeling between constituent parts of the UK. On the second point, which is super-Diceyan in its extremeness, we are not like the Aztecs who felt impelled to offer regular blood sacrifices of increasingly gross proportions in order to keep the sun providing warmth and the natural order of things in existence, nor should be believe that the earth will stop turning if Parliament does not churn out new laws. Laws on health and education which worked in 2010 are likely also to work in 2015 even if they do not match the UK government’s particular political agenda of the moment. A respite from legislative activism might be viewed as a blessing, particularly by those at the receiving end, and where something is required it will be for politicians to do what politicians do in order to reach a compromise: something that would be required in any event if proportional representation were to be introduced, which would normally result in no party having an overall majority.

For what it is worth, my own proposal for this is more limited than those emerging from the Tory party. By analogy with the power of delay for a year available to the House of Lords, if a Bill or separate Part of a Bill were not to have a majority in its favour in the Commons at third reading for the portion of the UK to which it applies as well as for the whole House, I propose that it could not be forced through against the wishes of the majority of those members representing that portion until the following session of Parliament. At all stages of a Bill all members would still exercise a vote; but people in England/Wales would get some protection at third reading against laws and decisions, applying to them only, being forced on them which are not approved of by their elected representatives. Where the government felt it really needed to force something through against the wishes of the representatives of those in England or England and Wales, they could do so, but after the same delay that could be imposed by the House of Lords. Possibly after a period of experience and the development of the processes of consultation and compromise that may be required, this power to delay could be transformed into a power to block.

For such arrangements to work, the extent of a Bill or separate part of a Bill would have to be certified by the Speaker. That used to be done before devolution for the purposes of the Scottish Grand Committee. Various new drafting conventions about how a Bill is divided into parts may be required so as to enable separate treatment in this way, but this is nothing that the flexibility of Parliamentary procedure (and the excellent drafting skills at the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel) could not manage. Those who say that there are insuperable technical difficulties are simply overstating or misunderstanding their case.

The Barnett formula

Lastly on this, I will turn again to the Barnett formula. I am not going to dwell on the supposed iniquities of the Barnett formula, except to say that despite all the hype emerging from the (UK) Scottish Office, the formula does not as some suggest result in an export of significant quantities of English tax payers’ cash north of the border (as opposed to the export of cash from the greater-south-east-of-England’s tax payers northwards and westwards, which does occur). Taking account of the geographical allocation of North Sea oil revenues based on what would be international boundaries, at present Scotland’s fiscal balances are no worse, and possibly slightly better, than that of the UK as a whole.

That will not always be the case. Scotland’s over-reliance on public sector employment and the exhaustion of oil and gas reserves in 30 or so years’ time will give rise to new imbalances, but they do not exist significantly at the moment.

Instead I deal with the Barnett formula here for two reasons. First, in order to dispel the argument against devolution in England which is based on the Barnett consequential, and secondly to explain why I do not think it will be in any new government’s plans to replace it with, say, a needs based formula.

On the Barnett consequential, the point here is that the passing of an Act for a particular service in England such as education or health which normally exercises politicians (say, how schools are to be organised, or the role of parents within them, and so forth) does not of itself normally require expenditure. There may be additional expenditure implications, but compared to current spend on the service they are likely to be de minimis, and at the end of the day any service must cut its cloth to the amount provided for it in any year by the process of supply. Ministers bargain with the Treasury on annual spending reviews on calculations of broad brush political calculation and policy aims, not a detailed analysis of particular service legislation.

The amount available to spend in furtherance of these services (so called “supply”) is established annually by Consolidated Fund Acts. This is linked in to the annual expenditure estimates laid by the Chief Secretary of the Treasury before the House of Commons each year, drawn up following the Treasury's spending review. Once approved by the House, authority to draw on the Consolidated Fund to meet the estimates in the first part of the following financial year (beginning on 1st April) is conferred by a Consolidated Fund Act. In the summer of the year, usually shortly before the summer recess at the end of July, these are incorporated into an annual Appropriation Act listing and authorising the appropriations for each head of service of each department for the year, usually followed by a further Appropriation Act towards the end of the financial year which sets out any excesses for the previous financial year and any supplementary supplies necessary since the estimates were drawn up for the current financial year.

The essential point here is that the determination of the Barnett uplift (the percentage of the increase in expenditure in England which is to go in block grant to the other countries in the UK) follows directly from the spending review giving rise to the estimates and any supplementary votes for central government departments. There is nothing to stop members for, say, Scotland expressing a view and exercising their vote when the annual estimates or any supplementaries are put forward in the Commons for the resolution of the House, if they feel that the “knock-on” effects on Scotland under the Barnett formula are not to their liking. That is quite different from being able to force through what the money voted for any particular head of service must be used for at the detailed implementation level in England, or to decide everything else which happens to be going on in England.

Secondly, the Barnett formula itself. At the moment it undoubtedly favours Scotland in a way that a needs based formula would not. The report of the Richards Committee probably sets out reasonably accurately how any needs based formula would in practice work. Its main effect would be to transfer some of Scotland’s block grant to Wales (a point also made by the Welsh Assembly’s Holtham Commission). England as a whole would stay pretty much the same (although there might be some changes in distribution within different parts of England), and because of the gearing caused by the fact that England represents some 83% of the population of the UK there is no significant pot of money hiding there for the English taxpayer to enjoy anyway.

Any new government will have to cut public expenditure. It will also have to deal with the SNP and with Scottish elections in 2011. Given that these cuts in public expenditure will have a significant impact on Scotland because of its reliance on the public sector, the last thing the new government will want to do is to make things worse by cutting Scotland’s block grant. Bad luck Wales.

Regional government

One feature of the present devolution arrangements which sometimes worries me is the thread of tribalism that lies underneath it. The very existence of a Scottish Parliament or a Welsh Assembly has within it the implicit view that on matters of social provision such as health and education, and indeed in social democracy itself, people within the UK are no longer “in it together”. However, now that tribalism within Scotland and Wales has found an outlet it should be no surprise if, in due course, the light reflected into England from this tribal mirror also begins to make its mark.

Or put more prosaically, I think it will be some time before the full consequences of the 1997 devolution project have worked their way through, and the Labour party having begun that project are unlikely to be able to maintain ownership of it as one suspects they originally thought they could. Having begun the project of devolution and accepted the fracturing of social democracy that it entails, we now have to see it through. It is too late to look back.

With that in mind, I am a fan of regional devolved government within England. My view is that if people in England were offered three regional parliaments and governments for the North, the Midlands and the South, with powers similar to those of the Welsh Assembly and government, and with an opportunity to say which region they thought they were in, it might well find favour at a referendum, and in particular in the north. The botched attempts of John Prescott which ended up in overwhelming rejection in the north-east in 2004 are attributable, I strongly suspect, to the fact that first they did not offer any meaningful devolution at all (a few transport matters would have gone from the Government Office for the North-East to the assembly, but most of the transport and planning powers were to be lifted from the county councils and unitary authorities and on planning were to be subject to central government direction anyway), and secondly that the proposals had the practical effect of dividing rather than representing the interests of the north of England. People in the north-east saw through it.

Some argue that the kind of federal regional devolution to which I have referred would result in a situation where the laws in, say, Manchester could be different from the laws in London, and that is (so the argument goes) ridiculous. To this I would only say first that that is devolution, and secondly that at present laws in Belfast and Edinburgh are different from those in Manchester, and in due course those in Cardiff will become different as well. One of the purposes of devolution was to allow that to happen and it seems a curious criticism to level against federal regional government. Behind it lies the unspoken thought that the 1997 devolution proposals were either wrong, or are not to be taken seriously.

Having said all those things, regrettably I do not think genuine regional government will happen. The Westminster political establishment still sees England as the prize and will not readily cede any meaningful responsibilities to powerful regions and their representatives. Prescott’s quest may have been hopeless politically, notwithstanding the ineffective job he made of it. I am as strongly opposed to pretend regional devolution as were the people of the north-east, and the problem with the Prescott proposals is that they did not, in fact, deal with the West Lothian Question anyway. They would probably still have to be coupled with some form of restricted voting at Westminster.

An English parliament

I am not a great advocate of an English parliament. There is a respectable argument for one, particularly in establishing and legitimising a new identity for those in England. However, to construct a new political class for England to provide complete equivalence to those in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland seems to me to be overkill when a simpler solution at Westminster for the West Lothian Question is available; and compared to regional devolution it does not move down powers to any significant degree. It seems possible that if given the choice, even today a majority in England would vote for an English Parliament, and over time that number is likely to become larger, but equally the opportunity in the next decade to make that choice is not likely to be offered by our politicians. Furthermore, I suspect a system of restricted voting at Westminster is the preferred option for most – but again we are unlikely actually to find out. If restricted voting happens, as I suspect it will, it will happen.

Having said that, I also suspect that we may end up with an English parliament after a number of decades by default. It could emerge from a slow metamorphosis of UK power structures into England power structures on matters which will have already become devolved in the remainder of the UK. However, that will be some time in the future I suspect, and time will tell. An English parliament would also be almost certain to emerge if fiscal autonomy were to arise in Scotland, for the reasons I explore further below. Where such Scottish fiscal autonomy would leave Wales and Northern Ireland, and how cross-subsidies from England would continue to operate, would then become quite problematic.

In the absence of regional devolution, an English Parliament would also be a pre-requisite of any federal system within the UK.

Fiscal autonomy

There is a very good reason why the Calman Commission trod carefully on matters of fiscal devolution. Its recommendations on this are relatively modest: they are, in effect, that the Scottish Parliament may set its own rate of income tax provided that it is not more than 10% below that set by the Westminster parliament for the remainder of the UK, and provided that the differential between tax bands is not changed. All money raised above the rate which is 10% below UK rates would go directly to the Scottish Consolidated Fund, in exchange for which the missing 10% would be deducted from the annual amount paid into the fund from the Treasury from UK taxation. So, if the Scottish Parliament were to set the same rate as applying in the remainder of the UK it would find its revenues broadly the same as without Calman; and if it were to set it higher or lower it would get proportionately more or less.

It seems highly unlikely that a Scottish Parliament would ever want to set a rate of income tax for Scotland more than 10% below that applying elsewhere in the UK, so the substantial effect is that Scots could set their own rate of income tax. The preclusion on changing tax bands may be as much in order to avoid arguments that, if MSPs can set their own rates of income tax, then their MP brothers in Westminster for Scottish constituencies should not be able to vote on income tax rates in the remainder of the UK, as it is to avoid unfair taxes on high earners in Scotland. In other words, the preclusion on changing tax bands is probably at least intended in part to avoid a West Lothian issue arising on taxation, where it would become serious.

Imagine then what would happen if there were to be financial autonomy for Scotland, under which the Scottish Parliament became responsible for raising its own taxation to meet its own expenditure. It seems inevitable that members of the UK parliament elected for Scottish constituencies would no longer be able to vote in connection with the fixing of rates of taxes such as income tax and corporation tax applying outside Scotland, to which their constituents would not be subject: were they to do so, it would fly against the constitutional links between taxation and representation, and be grossly unfair to people in the remainder of the UK. The link between taxation and representation, and the removal of the power of the Crown to tax without grant of the Commons in Parliament, formed one of the causes of the English Civil War (aka the Wars of the Three Kingdoms). We surely can’t and shouldn’t go back on this principle now.

If a UK government depended for its majority on its members for Scottish constituencies, it could be unable to raise the taxation for its own programmes. The only logical vehicle for introducing such fiscal autonomy in Scotland would be the creation of an English Parliament.

Other matters

One other “broad picture” point must be taken into account when looking at England.

On two occasions since the war, there has been a Labour government for the UK when England returned a majority of Tory members. The reverse happened in Scotland in the Thatcher governments and the Major government. If one is keeping score, Scotland has now moved ahead of England in the “we didn’t elect them” count. Given the current political complexion of Scotland it seems highly unlikely that at any time in the short to medium future Scotland would ever return more than a handful of Tory members, thus exacerbating this situation in times to come.

One might counter this legalistically by saying that this is what the Scots agreed to in the articles of union. One could also counter it politically by saying that this was one of the issues that the establishment of a Scottish parliament was intended to address. One should not underestimate the extent of the matters which have been devolved which, despite what the SNP say, are already very extensive – I personally regret the loss of a UK-wide national health service as something which binds us together.

I say this to illustrate the point that however aggrieved people in England may in the future think they have become, there is more than one point of view about representational fairness arising from the now multiple legislatures within the UK.

Where now for the Campaign for an English Parliament?

I hesitate to offer advice to the CEP because I have the reservations about their case which I have mentioned, and I am therefore not well qualified to do so. I suspect all they can do is sit it out, because as I have said I think time is on their side. Were the Scots to achieve any substantial fiscal autonomy, which is not impossible, that seems to me to require the establishment of an English Parliament in order to enable taxation to be raised legitimately with respect to the matters affecting England which are devolved elsewhere.

Perhaps my other main advice is to chill a little, and to spend less time aggravated by the fact that the Scottish parliament may have decided, by virtue of devolution, to offer some particular financial advantage for people in Scotland. Every pound that goes to, say, reduce prescription charges or abolish toll road charges in Scotland is a pound less which is available to the Scottish government to spend on something else. That is what devolution and the establishment of local priorities is about, and except when something like the student top-up fees affair arises, it has little to do with an English parliament.

Chris Vine blogs at The Withering Vine

This post is part of the Constitutional Futures series.

Power 2010 has recently published the results of its "deliberative phase" of proposals to re-invigorate British politics. This followed its earlier request for proposals from the public at large, 60 of which were then put to this "deliberative" stage. The deliberation was carried out by a representative sample of 200 UK citizens on 9 and 10 January. The top 29 topics following the scoring which accumulated on deliberation are now the subject of a period of internet voting, after which the five most popular will become the policies for constitutional change which it will ask candidates at the 2010 election to adopt as policy.

In this guest opinion piece I will approach it in the spirit in which it is intended, and not dwell on the fact that it is the party manifestos which set out what it is that the candidates will in fact pledge themselves to. Power 2010 will find it difficult to have any practical effect, but I suppose they are to be applauded on the initiative.

Overview

The thing which most struck me was the relatively unradical nature of most of the proposals, particularly those near the top of the list. This is not going to cause any re-enactment of the Chartist riots of the 1830s and 1840s; nor even the repeal of any Corn Laws. The no. 1 ranking following deliberation is given to strengthening select committees in the House of Commons, which doesn't sound to be the most appealing call to the manning of the barricades. The no. 2 ranking was "allowing voters to vote none of the above on ballot papers" which is particularly pointless: such markings on ballot papers are at present labelled and counted as "spoilt votes". (The fact that this ineffective idea did appear at no. 2 gives some hope that this exercise is not stage managed by constitutional enthusiasts.)

As to which my second thought is that the deliberative stage is only as good as the neutrality of the "guidance" given to the 200 citizens during their deliberations. Whilst this clip from "Yes, Minister" is intended mainly for humour, as with much of that series it is making a serious point. Polling companies stake their reputations on devising neutral non-leading questions which do not point to a particular outcome and therefore bias the result.

The proposals

Everyone will have their own views on what might make it to the final cut of 5 proposals. In looking down the list of substantive rather than trivial proposals, I have ignored those concerned with matters of privacy and databases and related human rights issues (and a referendum on substituting the euro for the pound which came in at an astonishing no. 12), as though important in their own right they seem to me to be not sufficiently connected with the re-invigoration of politics. The highest ranked proposal which I find of interest is one to "increase the number of issues decided by free votes" (no. 3), followed by direct democracy, that is to say more national consultation exercises on matters of importance before policy decisions are taken by means of referenda and the like, which forms three linked proposals at no. 4 in the deliberative results. After that, of the proposals in the results which I would regard as substantive and interesting without necessarily agreeing with them are MP recall votes (no. 9); doing away with some of the Freedom of Information Act exemptions (no. 10); giving MPs more control of the Parliamentary timetable (no. 13), linked in spirit at least to there being more free votes and which is much more far reaching than might be thought, because the control of Parliamentary time by the whips office is where much of the power lies; "allowing only English MPs to vote on matters affecting only England and only English and Welsh MPs to vote on matters affecting only England and Wales" (no. 16); only having ministers in the government from the House of Commons (no. 17); more devolution to local government (no. 18); and proportional representation (no. 23).

I have discounted from my list of interesting substantive proposals things like fixed-term Parliaments (no. 21) on the ground that it is not sufficiently ground-breaking, and having a written constitution (no. 26) on the ground that it is so ground-breaking that it asks more questions than it answers: in fact, producing a written constitution would require all 60 questions to be answered, and many others besides. I do not find a written constitution of itself particularly appealing - it is what would be in it which forms the grit.

Supporters of an English Parliament will be disappointed: following deliberation, holding a referendum on an English Parliament went to no. 45 and misses the cut. A referendum on an English Parliament ended up coming below even "Holding separate referendums (sic) on membership of the Union in England, Scotland and Wales" (no. 43), which seems an odd selection of priorities by the participants and it does make one wonder how reliably the exercise was carried out. The ranking also jars both with "Holding a referendum on the strongest form of devolution amongst the nations" which is higher again at no. 38, and which would of its nature require the referendum to cover whether there should be an English Parliament or regional government in England (although curiously the explanatory information indicates that "the nations" did not include England).

On the last point, I must come clean on this: readers of my own blog will know that I am not a great supporter of an English Parliament. Instead I would prefer to see real powers given to a parliament and government for three English regions, the North, the Midlands and the South, forming (with those already existing for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) a federal solution for the UK. I think that could give a new vibrancy to the whole of England (as opposed to the pathetic John Prescott proposals of earlier in the decade which were never intended to devolve anything meaningful and were intended to divide the north of England rather than represent it).

However, regional federalism came out even lower than an English Parliament, at no. 46, and in truth I have always recognised it to be a dead duck politically. Westminster career politicians are not going to vote to divest themselves of most of their current powers and leave themselves only with foreign affairs, defence, immigration, macro-economics and the benefits system as toys to play with, and reclaiming things from Scotland such as health provision to give politicians more to do at the UK level is likely to prove politically unachievable (there is no National Health Service at the institutional UK level any more and probably there cannot now be again). But by the same token, Westminster career politicians are not going to sign up to most of the other Power 2010 proposals either. And I recognise that an English Parliament is, in the decades to come, a more likely outcome than genuine regional devolution because it allows the more straightforward and less challenging metamorphosis of UK power structures into England power structures on matters which will have already become devolved in the remainder of the UK. The England rump ends up defining itself.

For those interested in voting systems, single transferable votes (sometimes also called alternative voting) ended up at no. 34 following deliberation, below proportional representation and missing the cut. Single transferable voting is, however, the only change to the voting system which is ever going to be implemented in practice, were first-past-the-post to be abandoned.

Another interesting one was "Selecting the Upper Chamber by lot from the population" (no. 49). This has a certain whimsical purity about it - a return to the ethos of the old House of Lords but with membership of the House of Lords determined by pure chance at birth (or perhaps on attaining majority) rather than by the chance of heredity at birth. It has a cousin "Selecting some councillors by lot from the local population" (no. 48) for the local level.

The problems

I have commented on the neutrality point, but one other significant problem with the exercise undertaken by Power 2010 is the fact that the issues dealt with cannot in truth be treated as discrete decomposed items in the way that appears in the table of post-deliberation results.

An example is the House of Lords. Having an elected House of Lords ended up ranked no. 28, just making the cut. However, whether the House of Lords is elected has an obvious effect on its political legitimacy and therefore on its power to override the House of Commons. If wholly elected, then the case for it to be able permanently to block rather than just delay a Bill also becomes considerably stronger. Likewise if the House of Lords is elected by proportional representation, the case for keeping first-past-the-post for the House of Commons becomes stronger, and there could be little justification for preventing members of the House of Lords from becoming ministers in the government. It also raises the question whether this new elected chamber should act as second chamber, or at least as an advisory chamber, for the legislatures for Scotland, Northern Ireland and (after a successful referendum under Part 4 of the Government of Wales Act 2006) Wales, given that a great deal of its time would otherwise be devoted to England-only legislation.

In fact, an elected House of Lords would require a wholesale review of the UK constitution going well beyond most of the other relatively modest proposals of the Power 2010 document. It might well require preparation of the written constitution to which I referred earlier.

By way of another example, one of the main arguments against English/Welsh votes on English/Welsh laws is the argument that the UK government must be able to get its business through, and to do that it may need to rely on (and whip the votes of) MPs for Scottish constituencies even though a matter may not by virtue of devolution affect Scotland. This is indeed what happened on student top-up fees in England and on some aspects of foundation hospitals. However, if there are to be more free votes as proposed, where each MP votes for what he or she thinks is the best for his or her constituents rather than in accordance with the party line, the argument for limiting voting rights to those whose constituencies are actually affected by the matter under consideration becomes obviously stronger.

Another problem is the inability of the process undertaken by Power 2010 to offer nuance on a number of the issues. On English/Welsh votes on English/Welsh laws, even though some protection for those in England against a recurrence of the student top-up fees affair is likely to be introduced at some point (and more quickly if the Tories win the next election), the formula at no. 16 which I have cited above does not in fact represent anything ever likely to be implemented, nor is the formula in its stark terms particularly realistic. Instead, the Tories propose an English Grand Committee at committee stage (a little different from the Scottish Grand Committee which used to sit on Scottish legislation, and in theory still can), together with restricted voting at report stage. Under the Tory proposal no Bill affecting England only or England and Wales only could pass either second or third reading without a vote in its favour by all members of Westminster Parliament. My own proposal in the absence of regional federal devolution or an English Parliament has been more limited: this is that, by analogy with the power of delay for a year available to the House of Lords, if a Bill or separate Part of a Bill were not to have a majority in its favour at third reading for the portion of the UK to which it applies as well as for the whole house, it could not be forced through against the wishes of the majority of those members representing that portion until the following session of Parliament. At all stages of a Bill all members would still exercise a vote; but people in England/Wales would get some protection at third reading against laws and decisions, applying to them only, being forced on them which are not approved of by their elected representatives. Possibly after a period of experience, this power to delay could be transformed into a power to block. (I also realise that those who want an English Parliament regard this as inadequate.)

Where we are

Power 2010 may counter criticisms of the kind I have mentioned on the grounds that their approach is the best which is achievable with "open authorship", and on that they are probably right. But the value of the outcomes can be judged from the coherency of the exercise undertaken.

I add to this that some good ideas have undoubtedly come from the process. The "direct democracy" proposals at no. 4 were right to come out near the top, and might if implemented do much to help counter public distrust in politics and politicians. But overall, the exercise and its outcomes seem to me a little like a Jackson Pollock art work. Throw some paint at it, stand back and hope that something has been achieved which hangs together as a complete work.

Well, I suppose I would say that, wouldn’t I? The results of last weekend’s deliberative poll of 200 ordinary UK citizens chosen ‘scientifically’ by the YouGov opinion-polling organisation, together with Professor James Fishkin of Stanford University (an expert in such exercises), were published today.

Basically, the gathering was considering a long list of 57 proposals for political and constitutional reform that represented the most popular out of 4,000 ideas sent to Power 2010 by the public. As English Parliament Online has already documented, the most popular out of these 57 proposals by a long chalk was holding a referendum on the creation of an English parliament, followed by a referendum on a proportional voting system and a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU.

In the deliberative assembly, before starting the discussions, the 200 attendees were asked to indicate their support for each of the 57 proposals. Then again after the discussions – which included seminar-style direction and guidance from a panel of ‘independent’ constitutional and legal experts – the citizens were asked to write down the degree to which they supported each proposal. This resulted in ‘before and after’ rankings. The top-29 proposals are now being submitted to a nationwide voting process to whittle them down to a list of five ideas that candidates at the general election will be asked to commit to.

As the press release states, in somewhat self-congratulatory tone: “In a surprising twist, populist reforms such as a fully elected House of Lords and lowering the voting age to 16 came relatively low down the priority list - with open primaries to select Parliamentary Candidates and a referendum on English devolution not even making the cut of options to be put to the public vote”.

Well, some of us don’t find that so surprising! In summary, the re-rankings that are of most interest to supporters of an English parliament are:

Yes, funny, isn’t it, how ‘populist’ proposals such as an English parliament, independence referendums in each of Great Britain’s nations, a referendum on a better devolution settlement and a referendum on Britain’s EU membership all got demoted as an effect of the deliberative process!

And strange that only one idea that recognises England’s democratic deficit – effectively, a version of English votes on English laws – made ‘the final cut’ of the top-29: precisely, a suggestion that preserves the present Union parliament intact and resists the creation of an English parliament in which MPs would be accountable to English voters and parties, not to a British mandate and British parties! Too much of a coincidence to be a mere accident, in my view.

But before I set out why I think that the results of the Power 2010 deliberation have no relevance for the case in favour of an English parliament, I want first to ask the following question: what exactly does Power 2010 mean by ‘populist’, here? Does that just mean ‘popular’, because there’s no doubt that an English parliament is an extremely popular idea. As Paul Senior – one of the 200 citizens – puts it in Power 2010’s press release, the proposal to ‘devolve England’ obtained the support of 51.7% of those who voted before the deliberation, falling to only 26.2% afterwards.

It seems to me that ‘populist’ does mean ‘popular’ but is a term intended to denigrate certain popular ideas that don’t sit comfortably with the liberal establishment. Indeed, the whole Power 2010 deliberative exercise is itself an explicitly anti-populist process: designed to take a set of raw, unthought-through ideas – including ‘extreme’ proposals that command mass support – and to refine, moderate and channel them in ways that are open to the reasoning and qualification of better educated, professional people who are experts and practitioners in the areas affected by the deliberation, i.e. politics and law. In other words, it’s a way of reintroducing disruptive ideas and politically alienated individuals into the established order and ways of doing things in order to counteract their revolutionary potential.

As a result, major constitutional-reform proposals tend to get demoted through the process of deliberation while relatively minor ones – even some that appear almost trivial – are promoted. This is because few ‘reasonable’ people, working together in a process that is intended to advance agreement and consensus, could object to certain ideas, especially if they are relatively easy to implement. Hence, ‘strengthening select committees’ came out at number one (promoted from number three pre-deliberation), followed by: ‘allowing voters to vote for “none of the above” on ballot papers’ [big deal: letting people abstain!]; and ‘increasing the number of issues [in Parliament] decided by free votes’. Well, these things are hardly earth-shattering or controversial, which is why everyone agrees about them!

By contrast, the discussion on an English parliament will undoubtedly have brought home to people some of the problems – real or imaginary – that an EP might present (and definitely would present to the political establishment) that they may not have thought about before. We know this is so because Power 2010 prepared a checklist of pros and cons on each idea for the delegates to read before the event, and the cons against an English parliament outnumbered the somewhat lukewarm pros in a way that has been fiercely criticised elsewhere. Accordingly, it’s hardly surprising that fewer people supported an EP after the deliberation than before.

This is no test for the merits and legitimacy of an English parliament, nor indeed for the level of popular support it commands, even if – through the insidious conflation of ‘popular’ with ‘populist’ – Power 2010 appears to be insinuating that popular anti-establishment ideas such as this will tend to lose much of their initial support when they are subjected to a reasoned process of weighing up their relative merits, informed by the self-preserving mindset of the liberal establishment and of better informed professionals.

Indeed, so much does the deliberative process promote itself as a ‘representative’ process (i.e. one that authentically embodies the collective will of the ‘nation’) over and above more ‘popular’ forms of democracy (e.g. ones that equate popular sovereignty with simple majorities in a mass poll) that ‘establishing a duty of public consultation on controversial matters through a deliberative process’ is promoted from number nine pre-deliberation to number four post-deliberation, in parity with ‘establishing a duty of public consultation on controversial matters through direct democracy’, e.g. through referendums. In other words, swayed and flattered by being elevated to the status of a citizens’ parliament selected, rather than elected, to deliberate on ‘the nation’s’ political future, the delegates not unnaturally have been moved to consider the deliberative process itself as being literally on a par with a popular referendum as a means to take decisions about matters of major controversy. For me, this appears to be a way in which the Power 2010 deliberation seeks to validate itself as a process that will come up with recommendations that represent the authentic, considered will of the people: one that prospective MPs should, then, duly take note of.

But what, or who, is the ‘nation’ that the Power 2010 delegates are said to ‘scientifically’ represent, making them entitled to vote on the merits of an English parliament? The Power 2010 press release is headlined, “29 ideas to clean up British politics to be put to nation”. So the ‘nation’, for Power 2010, is unambiguously the UK / Britain. The delegates, as the press release puts it, were “scientifically chosen to represent the UK as a whole”. And the broader ‘nationwide’ poll that will now ensue is a UK-wide poll.

Are we supposed to accept that a vote by 200 citizens from all four UK nations on a proposal to hold a referendum (in England only, presumably) on the establishment of an English parliament is just as valid an indication of the merits of, or support for, an English parliament as an actual referendum itself: UK-wide citizens’ deliberation thereby replacing an English popular vote on English governance? No, of course not: only the English people as a whole are qualified to decide whether to create an English parliament or, indeed, whether to hold a referendum on the subject! In short, this UK-wide deliberative exercise reproduces the West Lothian Question in a supposedly more reasoned and open form: non-English people voting on England-only matters.

Power 2010 replicates the West Lothian Question for precisely the same reason as the WLQ itself is sanctioned by Parliament: to preserve the Union parliament, the Union itself and the established order. The very premise behind the Power 2010 process is that the Union parliament is preserved, indeed enhanced, as the cornerstone of ‘British democracy’ and the only valid vehicle through which political and constitutional change should be advanced. It is for this reason that parliamentary candidates are going to be asked whether they are willing to sign up to Power 2010’s top-five proposals: because it’s Westminster MPs that are going to be entrusted with implementing them; and, indeed, the top ones that have emerged so far largely relate to Westminster’s workings themselves!

Such a process, built on such a deeply entrenched unionism and fundamental commitment to the Westminster parliament, could hardly be expected to encourage delegates to endorse an English parliament. And that’s not just because of political bias but because the process itself involves buying in to the established UK-parliamentary way of running ‘the country’, i.e. England.

I’ve previously expressed (e.g. here, here and here) my grave doubts about the legitimacy of the Power 2010 process as a means to promote genuine popular sovereignty – meaning, in relation to English matters, the sovereignty of the English nation – as the principal driver of fundamental political and constitutional reform for England and the UK as a whole. I’ve been rather disappointed at the lack of any response from Power 2010 to my critiques; but then, I shouldn’t be too surprised if my raising of the English Question is met with silence from them. Ultimately, for Power 2010, it seems the ‘nation’ is conflated with the polity (i.e. Britain), with the consequence that there is little scope to allow the nation as the people (England) to take charge of its own affairs in ways that might involve tearing down the edifice of the British state and building up a new English polity on new foundations: those of the will of the people.

It is for these reasons that the opinions of a statistically tiny polling sample of 200 English and non-English UK citizens swayed by the advice of a radically pro-Union panel of experts cannot in any way be taken as an authoritative test on the merits and / or popularity of an English parliament.

Those members of the Parliament at Westminster who are committed to preserving the United Kingdom have to face a ferociously difficult question. Now that the Scots and Welsh have decided to have devolution, how do we deliver a fair deal for England, and do the best job of preserving the Union.

William Hague has, quite rightly, announced that an incoming Conser-vative government would respect the outcome of the referenda. But Labour's compromise proposals are a consti-tutional mess. They do not solve the so-called West Lothian question, the problem of Scottish MPs voting on matters that solely affect the English, whilst the English MPs cannot vote on similar matters that solely affect the Scots. This treats the English (and to some extent the Welsh) very unfairly.

Nobody should doubt that the English feel as passionately about their country as do the Scots or Welsh. The willingness of the English to subordinate their 'Englishness' to the greater interests of the Union is a measure of the strength of their commitment to that Union, not of any weakness in their love of their own country.

The best demonstration of this is the extent to which the English have been willing to make sacrifices in the interests of the Union. For example, on the basis of population, Scotland has fourteen more MPs than it would have with English-sized constituencies. In terms of public expenditure per head, Wales receives one sixth more money than England, Scotland a fifth more, and Northern Ireland a third more. Neither should the clamouring of the Scottish Nationalists to the contrary confuse us. Even if we, quite wrongly, allocated all the North Sea revenues to Scotland, they would still be receiving a net £6 billion from the English taxpayer. In addition - unlike England - Scotland and Wales have their own Cabinet Minister to represent their own unique interests, as well as all the other Scots and Welsh members that have occupied positions in every Cabinet in modern times.

There are, of course, reasons for these differences, and the English have accepted them because the vast majority place enormous value on the Union. They recognise the energy that the United Kingdom has gained from the amalgamation of the talents of all parts of the Kingdom. They recognise the huge advantage in all areas of endeavour - scientific, literary, military, commercial or political - which arises out of their hybrid vigour. They know that the United Kingdom is very much more than the sum of its parts.

Which is why Labour's proposals are potentially so disastrous. The Govern-ment is meddling with a finely balanced structure, which has historically worked to everybody's advantage. They are taking the risk of starting a process that will unravel the tightly woven fabric of our country. If it goes wrong, this process will be slow at first, but will accelerate under the pressure of the discontent and disunity that devolution will stir up.

The compromises that Labour are putting together to achieve their ends, whilst still maintaining their political advantage, will exacerbate this dis-content. Those Welsh people that want an Assembly will resent the stronger Scottish institution. As for the English, Labour's attempts to provide supposed "fairness" with regional councils is, of course, nonsense. It will not solve the West Lothian question. They will simply create soulless regional bureaucracies; bleak outstations of Brussels.

Nobody could with any serious constitutional sense equate, say, a Yorkshire and Humberside regional council with the Scottish parliament. The constant constitutional mess that we are being offered in exchange for our heritage and history is not going to satisfy anyone.

It is no accident that Labour's proposals fit well with the wishes of the European Commission. In the federalist lexicon, the nation state is seen as the source of many evils, from unemploy-ment to war. Whilst this dogma is unsurprising given the history of some parts of Europe, it is an ideology wholly unsuited to the United Kingdom, a country that has enjoyed hundreds of years of democracy, peace and tolerance under one national government.

The nation state is the strongest manifestation of the democratic will of the people. It is a moral concept, indissolubly tied to the emotional identity of the people, and is not an administrative convenience to suit Labour's apparent urge to bypass Westminster by every means possible.

Accordingly, if this change is inevitable, then the people of England deserve nothing less than equal treatment. And, the people of Britain deserve a constitutional settlement that is at least logical. Otherwise, it will unravel under the pressure of its own inconsistencies.

If each of the other nations of the United Kingdom is going to have its own parliament , then England's choice should be no less. If Labour truly believes that this is the proper future for the people of Scotland and Wales, their logic must mean the same for England. This means equal treatment in all respects. Not just financially, although we should have funding equality for England, Scotland and Wales. Nor just in Westminster representation - although we should have that equalised from the next election, not in fifteen years time as Labour propose.

The people of England deserve no less than the same choice as the peoples of Wales and Scotland last September: a referendum on whether they want a parliament of their own. In their own words, Labour should trust the people - in this case the people of England. An English parliament, on the same basis as the Scottish one, will be the minimum that the English people are likely to be satisfied with.

Anything less will lead to disaffection and discontent, to a belief that the English are being treated as second class citizens in their own land. If Labour wanted to bring about the dissolution of the United Kingdom, that disaffection would be the way to do it.

Conservative Way Forward, 2001

The members of the English Parliament are fond of comparing themselves to the old Romans.

Not long since Mr Shippen opened a speech in the House of Commons with these words, “The majesty of the people of England would be wounded.” The singularity of the expression occasioned a loud laugh; but this gentleman, so far from being disconcerted, repeated the same words with a resolute tone of voice, and the laugh ceased. In my opinion, the majesty of the people of England has nothing in common with that of the people of Rome, much less is there any affinity between their governments. There is in London a senate, some of the members whereof are accused (doubtless very unjustly) of selling their voices on certain occasions, as was done in Rome; this is the only resemblance. Besides, the two nations appear to me quite opposite in character, with regard both to good and evil. The Romans never knew the dreadful folly of religious wars, an abomination reserved for devout preachers of patience and humility. Marius and Sylla, Caesar and Pompey, Anthony and Augustus, did not draw their swords and set the world in a blaze merely to determine whether the flamen should wear his shirt over his robe, or his robe over his shirt, or whether the sacred chickens should eat and drink, or eat only, in order to take the augury. The English have hanged one another by law, and cut one another to pieces in pitched battles, for quarrels of as trifling a nature. The sects of the Episcopalians and Presbyterians quite distracted these very serious heads for a time. But I fancy they will hardly ever be so silly again, they seeming to be grown wiser at their own expense; and I do not perceive the least inclination in them to murder one another merely about syllogisms, as some zealots among them once did.

But here follows a more essential difference between Rome and England, which gives the advantage entirely to the latter — viz., that the civil wars of Rome ended in slavery, and those of the English in liberty. The English are the only people upon earth who have been able to prescribe limits to the power of kings by resisting them; and who, by a series of struggles, have at last established that wise government where the prince is all-powerful to do good, and, at the same time, is restrained from committing evil; where the nobles are great without insolence, though there are no vassals; and where the people share in the government without confusion.

The House of Lords and that of the Commons divide the legislative power under the king, but the Romans had no such balance. The patricians and plebeians in Rome were perpetually at variance, and there was no intermediate power to reconcile them. The Roman senate, who were so unjustly, so criminally proud as not to suffer the plebeians to share with them in anything, could find no other artifice to keep the latter out of the administration than by employing them in foreign wars. They considered the plebeians as a wild beast, whom it behoved them to let loose upon their neighbours, for fear they should devour their masters. Thus the greatest defect in the government of the Romans raised them to be conquerors. By being unhappy at home, they triumphed over and possessed themselves of the world, till at last their divisions sunk them to slavery.

The government of England will never rise to so exalted a pitch of glory, nor will its end be so fatal. The English are not fired with the splendid folly of making conquests, but would only prevent their neighbours from conquering. They are not only jealous of their own liberty, but even of that of other nations. The English were exasperated against Louis XIV for no other reason but because he was ambitious, and declared war against him merely out of levity, not from any interested motives.

The English have doubtless purchased their liberties at a very high price, and waded through seas of blood to drown the idol of arbitrary power. Other nations have been involved in as great calamities, and have shed as much blood; but then the blood they spilt in defence of their liberties only enslaved them the more.

That which rises to a revolution in England is no more than a sedition in other countries. A city in Spain, in Barbary, or in Turkey, takes up arms in defence of its privileges, when immediately it is stormed by mercenary troops, it is punished by executioners, and the rest of the nation kiss the chains they are loaded with. The French are of opinion that the government of this island is more tempestuous than the sea which surrounds it, which indeed is true; but then it is never so but when the king raises the storm — when he attempts to seize the ship of which he is only the chief pilot. The civil wars of France lasted longer, were more cruel, and productive of greater evils than those of England; but none of these civil wars had a wise and prudent liberty for their object.

In the detestable reigns of Charles IX and Henry III the whole affair was only whether the people should be slaves to the guises. With regard to the last war of Paris, it deserves only to be hooted at. Methinks I see a crowd of schoolboys rising up in arms against their master, and afterwards whipped for it.

Extract from Letters on England by Voltaire.

Imagine that the creation of a devolved English parliament was a manifesto commitment of the incoming party, and the new government undertook a public consultation to decide where the new parliament should be based.

What would be your preference?

Extract from the Liberal Democrats policy paper "For the People, By the People", Autumn 2007.

6.3 The English Question

6.3.1 During the 1980s, the Conservative Government used its majority in the House of Commons to force through highly controversial legislation that applied only to Scotland, despite the fact that Scottish support for the Tories had substantially declined. Scottish voters were effectively disenfranchised and increasingly frustrated by the government’s activities. This gave added urgency to the cause of Scottish devolution.

6.3.2 However, devolution to Scotland and Wales has resulted in a new anomaly. Scottish and, to a lesser extent, Welsh MPs can vote in Westminster on legislation that will affect only England. While sometimes the opposite applies, with English MPs voting on legislation only affecting Scotland and Wales, this is far rarer. The issue arises because of the asymmetrical devolution so far introduced in the UK, with the Scottish Parliament having significant law-making powers, the National Assembly for Wales having more control over its own law and policy (though mainly over secondary legislation) and the English having no equivalent separate body.

6.3.3 Some advocate giving powers to an English Parliament as a way of overcoming this anomaly. Others believe that while all MPs elected to the UK Parliament deal with UKwide business, it would be possible for those MPs who represent English constituencies to deal with England only business in a separate forum and as an additional responsibility. To work properly, however, both models would require a separate executive arm for England. Clearly, if a different party were to hold a majority of seats in England to that which had an overall majority in the UK, this would be politically as well as constitutionally imperative.

6.3.4 Such a change would alter significantly the role of the UK Parliament in the affairs of the UK, reducing substantially the policy areas over which it had competence. If an English assembly of some kind were to be established within Westminster, composed solely of UK MPs representing English constituencies, inevitably it would be that assembly which dealt with much of the legislative business. On the Scottish model, the new English legislature and executive would gain power over health, education and training, local government, social work, housing, economic development, many aspects of transport law and home affairs (including, the police and the emergency services), and some policy concerning the environment, agriculture, forestry and fishing, sport and the arts, as well as statistics, public registers and records.

6.3.5 Importantly though, if the English executive were to be established along these lines, UK fiscal, economic and monetary policy would remain with the UK Parliament, with UK MPs deciding the level of taxation for, and allocation of resources to, each part of the Union. It is likely that an English executive, governing a large proportion of the UK in such a wide range of areas, would argue strongly that the UK Parliament should not frustrate its policies by agreeing on a financial settlement which has the consent of the UK Parliament as a whole, but not of a majority of English MPs. We believe this problem would be particularly acute if an English executive were not coupled with the arrangements for fiscal federalism we outline in 6.4, and would still be significant even if it were. It is for these reasons that many feel that a substantial layer of English governance – based, as it would be, on such a disproportionate part of the Union – would bring into serious question the continuing role of the UK Parliament and, by extension, of the UK itself, to which Liberal Democrats in England, Scotland and Wales are firmly committed.

6.3.6 Liberal Democrats want to see, as far as possible, decisions made, and services delivered, as near to the people and communities concerned as possible. To this end our local government policy paper, The Power to be Different, states that local authorities should be “the basic building block of government and public service delivery in England”. However, in the case of decisions and services affecting a large number of communities, or those spread over a large area, it advocates central government handing over powers and responsibilities to regional government. We also state in that paper our support for directly elected regional government in those areas where the public want it.

6.3.7 To this end, there is a wider party and national debate to be had as to whether domestic policy for England should be determined at national level or regional level. For many, England has a distinct national identity and they argue that it would entirely justified for there to be an English Parliament or Assembly and an English executive. Others argue that to devolve power from the UK Parliament, which represents c.60 million people, to an English Parliament, representing c.50 million people, would fail to bring government closer to the people and that instead there should be devolution to the English regions or to even smaller units.

6.3.8 In light of these arguments we believe that further consideration needs to be given to the mechanics and implications of such a constitutional change, and that any proposed change would require the endorsement of the British electorate. That is why we believe that this matter should be part of the remit of the constitutional convention that this paper advocates in chapter 2. The convention’s proposals, which would include a solution to the English question, would then be put to the UK public in the referendum seeking endorsement of the wider constitutional settlement.

6.4 Financial Issues Associated with Devolution

6.4.1 A key challenge of further devolution will be changing the funding system in the UK. The current funding regime throughout the UK is based around grants from Westminster. In the case of both the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly their executives have considerable freedom over the use these grants are put to, while in England much of the grants given to local government are ring-fenced and have to be spent on policies defined by central government.

6.4.2 The amount of the grant given to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is decided by the Barnett formula, which was a temporary measure introduced ahead of the expected devolution to Scotland in the late 1970s. The Barnett formula does not redistribute wealth between areas of the UK. Rather it links increases or decreases in spending in England to proportional changes in the grants to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It does not decide the overall size of budget or take into account public expenditure need. Indeed it was assumed that devolution would result in the establishment of a more needs-based funding calculation, which never took place due to the no vote in the referendum on a Scottish Parliament in 1979.

6.4.3 Liberal Democrats believe that, as well as devolving political power out from Westminster, fiscal power also needs to be devolved from the Treasury if the UK is to have a genuine federal system. While others propose full fiscal autonomy for the devolved governments (where they would raise all the taxes and then remit an agreed amount to Westminster), no other industrialised country has opted for this for a number of reasons. Fiscal federalism, however, avoids the pitfalls of fiscal autonomy and should give the institutions to which power is devolved substantial control over the levers of power controlling funding. That means the devolved institutions should raise as much of their own spending as practicable, and be able to significantly influence the development of their economy. It would also mean establishing agreed rules on such things as prudential borrowing. An essential element therefore of fiscal federalism is for devolved governments to have powers of taxation. Liberal Democrats endorse the principles of fiscal federalism set out in the Steel Commission report, and believe that the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly should have more powers and freedoms to level their own taxes. We are also committed to increasing the percentage of revenue that regional and local authorities in England raise.

6.4.4 How fiscal federalism would work has been considered in detail for Scotland in the Steel Commission report. The Commission concluded that fiscal federalism in Scotland would mean the Scottish Parliament is given responsibility for all taxes except for those reserved to the UK, and that this would include the right to abolish and introduce new devolved taxes. Under these proposals the Scottish Parliament would have the ability to vary the rate and tax base for each devolved tax, and the power to borrow, subject to specific criteria. Were the Steel Commission’s proposals to be extended, the funding powers devolved to each nation and region would be a matter for each to decide and should be considered alongside work on the legislative and policy powers of the directly elected assembly representing it.

6.4.5 As the UK is a diverse country in terms of wealth, income and need, raising a greater proportion of taxation locally means there would have to be an element to redistribution in the interests of national unity and if poorer areas are not forced to have punitively high tax rates or sub-standard services. We believe the Barnett formula should be replaced by a new needs-based equalisation formula – the Revenue Distribution Formula – as set out in Policy Paper 75 Fairer, Simpler, Greener. This would take into account factors such as geography, how rural an area is, health, the state of infrastructure, poverty and deprivation and the cost of delivering services. The Formula would be drawn up by a Finance Commission of the Nations and Regions (FCNR). This would be made up of representatives of the UK government and representatives from the National Assembly for Wales, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the London Assembly, plus those from any English regional chambers or assemblies. It would reach its conclusions by consensus and any proposals would be ratified by the respective executive bodies. As well as agreeing the equalisation formula, the FCNR would also be charged with developing work on the whole agenda of fiscal federalism.

The scandal provoked by MPs’ dodgy expenses claims earlier this year led to unprecedented professions of interest in constitutional reform on the part of the three main parties. In a single week, as I recall, all the party leaders lined up to set out their priorities and proposals in this area. However, none of these proposals and very little of the overall discussion addressed the so-called English Question: the issue of how England should be governed as a nation, taking into consideration the impact on England and the Union as a whole of devolution in the three other constituent parts of the Kingdom.

I personally favour the establishment of an English Parliament to deal with the work of government and areas of legislation that are now almost exclusively England-focused, including the ‘big three’ of education, health, and justice and policing. Such a parliament, which could comprise considerably fewer MPs than the present tally of UK-parliament MPs representing English constituencies, would probably require or lead to the creation of a federal or even confederal UK of four national communities (or five if you count Cornwall), with a greatly slimmed-down UK-federal parliament dealing with what are presently referred to as ‘reserved’ matters and perhaps replacing the House of Lords in some of its scrutiny functions.

However, I’m not expecting even the more modest proposal of ‘mere’ devolution for England, and the establishment of an English parliament with functions akin to those of Holyrood, to be adopted by the three main parties as manifesto proposals at the next general election. But what I would be extremely disappointed to see – but, I have say, what I actually expect to see – would be if those manifesto proposals that do relate mainly or exclusively to England continue to be presented and described as if they affected and would be implemented across the UK as a whole.

The parties and, it has to be said, most of the mainstream media have carried out a vast deception of the English people in the period since devolution by continuing to refer to England-only or England-mainly policies and legislation as if they were ‘British’. I say ‘continuing to refer’ because, prior to devolution, legislation on education, health and justice was enacted on a genuinely UK-wide basis by all the MPs of the UK Parliament, even if the specifics varied to some extent country by country, with separate criminal law and a distinct education system in Scotland, for instance. Now, in the wake of devolution, bills in these areas – along with those in other policy areas that have been devolved – almost exclusively affect England only, the most prominent exception being justice, law and policing, which England shares with Wales. But politicians and the media continue to discuss these matters as if they affected all the people of the UK, which is simply untrue. Indeed, putting it uncharitably, this is a lie.

This practice is so widespread, so all-pervading and – as the BBC itself has called it – so ‘instinctive’ that one sometimes has to make an effort and pinch oneself to force oneself to be aware of it. Take the recent row about the parties’ respective financial and moral commitments to the NHS sparked off by Tory MEP Dan Hannan’s dismissive remarks towards the NHS in a US talk show in the midst of the controversy over there regarding Barack Obama’s health-care reforms. Not one of the many articles on the controversy I came across on TV, radio or online – and I mean not a single one – referred to the fact that the NHS that the present Labour government and a prospective Tory government were or would be in charge of was not the British NHS but the English NHS: national-UK governments are no longer responsible for ‘the’ NHS throughout the UK but only in England. In fact, as a result of devolution, there is no single ‘British NHS’ but rather four NHS’s run by each of the bodies responsible for the government of the UK’s constituent countries. But the ‘E’ word – England – was conspicuously absent from any of the parties’ protestations about their commitment to the NHS, even though it was England that was effectively being talked about.

When you draw this sort of thing to people’s attention, there’s often a sort of embarrassed silence, which in a way mirrors the silence to which the word ‘England’ itself is subjected in presentations and debates about policy issues that affect her. This embarrassment is associated almost with a sort of incredulity and sense of outrage that one should dare to suggest that weighty ‘British’ matters are in fact no such thing but are, rather, merely domestic English concerns. And this unwillingness on the part of politicians, parties, the media and ordinary people to acknowledge English matters as English, not British, also involves denial, in the psychological sense of the term: a refusal to acknowledge and consciously articulate a painful truth. That painful truth, for us in England, is that the old unitary UK is gone, dead; and that, like a child that grows up and painfully has to separate itself from its parent, England must now manage its domestic affairs on its own.

Except, of course, that separation of its identity and assumption of control over its own life from an overweening parent has yet to be completed in England’s case. We’re stuck in a sort of transitional state – indeed, to continue the psychoanalytical metaphor, England’s continuing attachment to Britain and unwillingness to be separated from it is akin to that of an infant’s attachment to a ‘transitional object’: reflecting an identity not yet fully differentiated from that of its parent. So we blunder on, with England’s affairs being ‘managed’ for her by a parent that is too scared to let go; a parent from which we, the English, are also still too scared to separate in case we feel too little and powerless in the big wide world without our powerful protector behind us.

It’s time to abandon this infantilism. English matters – those areas of governance that relate to England only – are already distinct from UK-wide matters: devolution has brought about that divide. Let’s acknowledge that fact as a first step towards enabling the people of England to take charge of their own affairs.

And that, essentially, is where the main parties have a big role to play. They, we, must stop the denial and start honestly referring to policy and legislation that relates to England as English. A failure to do so means continuing to be dishonest to the English electorate. And that body of voters does really matter to the parties, as they need to win in England – albeit that ‘winning’ is defined only in terms of gaining the majority of English parliamentary seats, rather than the majority of English votes – in order to be able to claim any kind of democratic mandate to govern the UK as a whole. But the recent constitutional crisis of confidence on the part of the main parties was a reaction to the evidence of widespread disenchantment on the part, mainly, of English people with the British politicians and parties that are supposed to represent them. It’s English people that the Westminster elite has mainly become disconnected from; and perhaps the greatest single contributory factor behind this is the fact that the political class and the big-three parties have themselves lost the English connection: the fact that in domestic, social policy, the country for which they have to propose and implement a credible and realistic vision is England, and no longer Britain.

Once we begin to acknowledge this fact, we can begin the long road to recovery. By which I don’t mean merely economic recovery but also social, political and psychological recovery: reconnecting politics to the people, and restoring the faith that politicians and people can be partners in a common enterprise to fashion a better future for ‘the country’. But that country is – can now only be – England. There no longer exists a common British social fabric for which the Westminster parliament is solely and exclusively responsible. Separate administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are charting separate courses for their respective countries, and Westminster has equipped them with the legal responsibilities and the administrative tools to implement a social vision for their nations. For England, it is still the UK parliament that remains responsible for social policy for England. But unless and until Parliament acknowledges its responsibility in the social domain as being towards England, it will not be able to re-establish itself as a parliament for England, even if it is the de facto parliament of England.

But the parties, clearly, are unwilling, indeed afraid, to speak the name of the country for which they will be proposing solutions and remedies at the next general election. Why? Because they are afraid of breaking up the UK-wide power base they currently aspire to take command of by seeking, instead, to derive their authority from the people of England: from their needs, their priorities and their hopes for their country. But power and authority do stem from the people; the power and authority of Westminster governments derive, in particular, from the assent of the English people. The only way that assent can be genuine is if the parties now start to be honest about which of their policies are actually for the people of England, so that the votes of the English people can be based on a true and fair reflection of what English voters actually want for their country. Anything else is simply a denial of ‘English votes on English matters’ in the true sense: the right of the English people to be democratically consulted on the matters that affect them.

If, for a change, the parties finally do explain to the English people which areas of UK-government action and policy relate only to England, the people may indeed start to ask themselves why there is not a separate English parliament to deal with such concerns. Why, indeed? But that is no reason for the parties to deny them that choice by doing their utmost to even suppress the thought. Psychological and political repression cannot last for ever. Sooner or later, the people of England will wake up to the realisation that the parties have deceived them for so long. Better for the parties to ‘fess up’ before that time and accompany the English people on their road to recovery and a new democratic future. Who knows where that road will take us? But it’s up to the parties to determine whether they want to be party to the ‘us’ – the English – in question.

And that’s because England matters, and the parties cannot for ever take the votes of the English for granted.

This poll is prompted by the setting up of the UKIP 1997 Group and its associated Facebook group.

In his address to UKIP’s 2006 Party Conference, Vernon Coleman told the audience that "The English desperately needs a party to represent them" and that UKIP should "fight hard" for an English Parliament.

Look at the results of any election. UKIP gets very few votes in Scotland or Wales. Most don't fly union flags in Scotland. Many Scottish and Welsh nationalists genuinely believe that they are one step from independence. In reality, they are further from independence than they've ever been and if they had any sense they would be fighting against the EU with all their might.

We need to fight hard for an English Parliament, where Englishmen and women can decide the fate of Englishmen and women. It is outrageous that Scottish MPs can introduce legislation on health and education which don't affect their constituents. And it's equally absurd that anyone should consider foisting a Scottish Prime Minister on us.

The present UKIP position, evolved from David Campbell-Bannerman’s 2006 press release, advocates dual-mandate governance and a consistent UK-wide approach, in contrast to the present constitutional asymmetry.

The UKIP Solution

• The Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly will be retained but MSPs and Assembly Members for Wales and Northern Ireland will be scrapped.
• An ‘English Parliament’ [a Grand Committee of UK MPs with English constituencies] will sit in the present House of Commons on ‘English Days’ to debate English affairs and English legislation.
• Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Westminster MPs would sit as members of their respective national parliaments/assmblies (129 MSPs would therefore be reduced to 55 dual mandate Scottish MPs, the 60 Welsh Assembly members would be replaced by the 32 Welsh Westminster MPs and the 108 Members of the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly will be replaced by 18 Westminster representatives).
• For some time in every month, assuming 1 week, the national bodies of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland would meet in plenary within their home nations, and conduct additional committee work during Westminster weeks or recesses, as necessary.
• The unicameral nature of the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish national chambers would be addressed by the House of Commons when it meets as the UK Parliament (the dual mandate chambers of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland would be scrutinised by Westminster MPs).
• England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will each have their own First Minister selected from among their Westminster MPs.
• Devolved powers would be amended to prevent any UK citizen being disadvantaged in another nation within the UK (for example it would not be possible for Scottish universities to charge English students for services that they provide for free to Scottish students and students from other EU nations).
• Dependent on function Whitehall will be reorganised into either UK-wide or English departments. For example, a UK Department of Health will specify common standards, frameworks and approaches for the NHS across the UK, but national bodies will hold the Northern Irish NHS, Scottish NHS, Welsh NHS and English NHS to account at the national level.
• UKIP would seek a fair and balanced new alternative to the Barnett Formula based on rural, suburban and urban criteria, and on need, not arbitrary measures.

[Source (pdf)]

UKIP’s proposals raise a number of interesting questions.

1. Would the UK parties still have (for example) both a Scottish manifesto and a UK manifesto, and; which of these manifestos is a Scottish politician being elected and held to account on?
2. Do dual mandate MPs suffer from a conflict of interest, and; does a chamber comprised of dual-mandate MPs have any power of independent thought and action?
3. Are UKIP's proposals actually achievable; do the Scots, Welsh and Irish actually want their national bodies, comprised of representatives with an explicity national mandate, replaced by dual-mandate British MPs, and; if they don’t, could a Westminster government realistically impose this compromise upon them?
4. Would the English vote for a dual-mandate ‘English Parliament’ or would the English prefer the real thing, and; should England be offered that choice?
5. What powers would a First Minister have, and; would he/she have a cabinet and could those cabinet ministers also be ministers in the UK cabinet? In addition, would there be enough MPs in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to form a cabinet from politicians of one party?
6. Would UKIP's proposals improve governance and scrutiny of legislation and post-legislative executive action.

In 2005 Conservative Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, James Gray MP, suggested the same policy of dual-mandate governance as UKIP. So conscious were the Conservatives of Scottish public opinion on the matter that he was forced to resign shortly afterwards.

UKIP differ from the Conservatives in the fact that they are highly unlikely to form the next UK Government. Given that fact it is possible that UKIP have devised a policy that is superficially equitable but unachievable (because at least one of the English, Scottish, Welsh or Northen Irish public will not consent to it) and, if implemented, unworkable in practice, possibly leading to constitutional chaos.

What do you think of UKIP’s proposals?

The UK Independence Party has today (21.3.06) launched its plans for fair representation for all Britons by calling for the creation of an English Parliament.

Party Chairman, David Campbell-Bannerman said: “The current system of national parliaments for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland has created a serious imbalance which is regularly exploited by the Government as it rams through English legislation using the votes of Welsh and Scottish MPs, whose constituents would not be affected by the outcome.

The UKIP solution, revealed by Mr Campbell-Bannerman is to scrap the existing Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies and the Scottish Parliament, and re-constitute them without the expensive buildings, using Scottish, Welsh and Irish Westminster MPs. English MPs would form the English Parliament. All MPs would sit for 3 weeks at Westminster, followed by one week’s plenary on devolved issues within the devolved parliaments/assemblies.

Mr Campbell-Bannerman continued: “UKIP is a UK wide party, and is proud of it. The time has come, however, to treat the English fairly by creating an English Parliament and putting England on a par with Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales.

“The Government’s tinkering with the constitutional settlement of the United Kingdom has created a serious democratic imbalance which requires urgent attention. The solution is not a series of small regional governments housed in shoddily built yet hugely expensive new offices, but a cheaper, more democratic use of existing institutions and elected representatives.”

The UKIP answer to the West Lothian Question

1. UKIP is the true party of the UK. We believe that each part of the UK should be treated fairly and equally, in terms of policy and representation, and that the present structure has failed to solve the ‘West Lothian Question’.
2. National parliaments/assemblies should be retained - should that be the continued wish of the people of those individual nations - but regional government and regional chambers, particularly the English regional chambers, be dismantled. However, all measures passed under devolved powers by devolved bodies that would act to disadvantage one part of the UK over another (such as free tuition fees/dental fees/free nursing care) will be made subject to referral to UK Westminster Government for final approval. Devolved powers would be altered accordingly.
3. UKIP is the true party of localism and local democracy – we will give the people the power of national referendums and give local bodies local independence and control of schools, hospitals and planning.
4. UKIP will fight for the distinctive British means of government – a strengthened House of Commons, a reformed and elected House of Lords, the well proven and historic system of county councils, metropolitan, town, district and parish councils.
5. UKIP will act to remove unnecessary and costly tiers of government and not just talk about it as other parties do.

National policies:

1. Scotland

• UKIP will scrap all MSPs and have Scottish Westminster MPs sit in the Scottish Parliament, returning all savings made in a council tax refund. UKIP will also scrap all MEPs on leaving the EU.
• Scottish Westminster MPs would sit 3 weeks in Westminster, with some Scottish Parliamentary committee meetings; followed by I week’s plenary in the Scottish Parliament.
• UKIP would restore UK Westminster control over high level, common matters across all departments, with small UK-wide departments for education, health, home affairs, transport etc. Delegated powers to national bodies would be trimmed accordingly
• UKIP will give consideration to demolishing the ugly and unpopular Scottish Parliament building, and sell the site for housing. The Scottish Parliament will be moved to more appropriate refurbished, historic buildings.
• UKIP will restore the Scottish regiments, and disband the EU- driven Euro regional army structure. UKIP will use savings from leaving the EU to spend on strengthening defence.
• UKIP will argue for Scottish ships to be built in Scottish yards [ NB loss of contract to Poland nearly closed Ferguson’s Yard ].

2. Wales

• UKIP will abolish the Welsh Assembly and scrap all Welsh Assembly members. Welsh Westminster MPs will sit in a new Welsh National Council, sitting alternate months in North and South Wales, and returning all savings made in a council tax refund. UKIP will also scrap all MEPs on leaving the EU.
• Welsh Westminster MPs will sit 3 weeks in Westminster, with some Welsh National Council committee meetings, followed by one week’s plenary in the Welsh National Council.
• UKIP would restore UK Westminster control over high level, common matters across all departments, with small UK-wide departments for education, health, home affairs, transport etc. Delegated powers to national bodies would be trimmed accordingly.
• UKIP will close the present ( leaky ) new Welsh Assembly building with more appropriate and less costly temporary facilities in North and South Wales.
• UKIP will restore the Welsh regiments, and disband the EU-driven Euro regional army structure. UKIP will use savings from leaving the EU to spend on strengthening defence.

3. England

• UKIP will solve the ‘West Lothian Question’ by creating an English Parliament, but not through a new and wasteful new building, but by reserving days at Westminster for English-only debates and issues – called ‘English days’.
• Existing English Westminster MPs would sit in the English Parliament
• UKIP would restore UK Westminster control over high level, common matters across all departments, with small UK-wide departments for education, health, home affairs, transport etc. Delegated powers to national bodies would be trimmed accordingly
• UKIP would recognise de facto ‘English-only ministries' ( such as Department of Education bringing forward an English only Education Bill ) by creating an English Executive. There would be an English First Minister, but he or she would be a UK Westminster MP.
• English Westminster MPs will sit 3 weeks in Westminster performing their UK-wide duties and English Parliament committee meetings; followed by I week’s plenary in the English Parliament.
• UKIP will disband all English regional chambers and replace Regional Development Agencies. English county councils, district councils and parish councils will all be saved and strengthened.

4. Northern Ireland

• UKIP respects the unique circumstances applying in Northern Ireland, and supports the Good Friday Agreement. We will retain and support the Northern Ireland Assembly in its current form, and encourage its recommencement.
• In the long term, as circumstances allow, UKIP will seek to treat Northern Ireland in the same manner as all UK home nations, by replacing Northern Ireland Assembly members with Westminster MPs, returning all savings made in a council tax refund. UKIP will also scrap all MEPs on leaving the EU.
• UKIP will restore UK and Irish regiments, and disband the EU-driven Euro regional army structure. UKIP will use savings from leaving the EU to spend on strengthening defence.

Local Policies:
5. Local elections

• UKIP will disband all English regional chambers and replace Regional Development Agencies with strategic groups formed of county or unitary authorities. We will save and strengthen English county councils, unitary, metropolitan, district and parish councils, to bring government closer to the people.
• UKIP will cut the unnecessary Government Offices of the Regions
• UKIP will act to remove unnecessary and costly tiers of government, and not just talk about it ( as the Tories do – who are often in control of regional bodies they could do away with )
• UKIP opposes EU-driven regional government in all its forms: amalgamation of historic police forces, regiments and council planning powers
• UKIP is the true party of localism and local democracy – we will give local bodies local independence and control of schools, hospitals and planning – where local people’s needs are constantly being overridden by EU and UK bureaucrats
• UKIP will use savings from leaving the EU to cut council tax – our aim is to replace council tax with a local sales tax, illegal under EU laws.

ENDS